Abstract. We examine the impact of information regarding other people's choices on individual choice in a public good experiment with two separate treatments. In the implicit treatment, subjects do not see the average contribution of others in their group, but they can calculate it from the information available. In the explicit treatment, subjects see the average contribution of others in their group. If subjects are rational calculating agents as suggested in mainstream economic theory there should be no difference in observed behavior across treatments: agents should use all available information to make decisions.
Introduction
Over the last few years the experimental literature has provided a wealth of empirical evidence in support of the idea that we are fundamentally social beings and our behavior is influenced by that of others (Fehr et al., 2009) . Social cues can be a powerful source of motivation: gene-culture co-evolution models suggest that groups tend to prefer members to share values in order to work more productively together and punish transgression of social norms (Boyd and Richerson, 1989; Bowles, 1998 Bowles, , 2001 ). The evidence from game theory indicates that agents like to punish transgressors, and that social pressure can improve reciprocation from selfish agents (for a review of the evidence see Fehr et al. (2009)) . Behavioral experiments in both psychology and economics have also provided support to the presence of framing effects: presentation changes the way people respond to a problem (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000) . Research on framing in psychological games (games in which payoffs depend on beliefs and not just actions) by Dufwenberg et al. (2010) shows that social influences and framing interact with each other through belief formation: frames influence beliefs about others' beliefs (rather than their actions) and that might be sufficient to change player's own chosen actions.
Social norms have long featured in explanations of individual and group behavior by economists, from the early work on social norms and conformism by Akerlof (1980) and Jones (1984) to the recent contributions by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) ; Jeanne (2009, 2010 ). Akerlof's theory of social custom states that social norms are endogenously determined and depend on the proportion of people who believe in them. As individuals differ both in their beliefs and the willingness to conform to other people's beliefs, the resulting range of social codes is consistent with multiple equilibria.
The degree of conformity with social norms is individual, but systematic variation by gender has been observed in the burgeoning literature on the effect of gender on preference formation and mutation. For example Kamas et al. (2008) find that there are gender differences in altruistic behavior with women giving more than men in anonymous giving to charity and increasing total contributions in mixed-sex pairings. A recent review of the evidence from experimental economics by Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggests that although women are not necessarily more altruistic than men, they are more likely to be affected by social clues on appropriate behavior.In Della Giusta et al. (2011a) , we found that conformity with social norms is higher for women than men in the UK, and that whilst part of the difference in life satisfaction between women and men in the UK can be attributed to the different activities men and women carry out, a substantial part can be explained by the fact that women and men give different weights to satisfaction with different life dimensions, effectively constructing systematically different utility functions (Della Giusta et al., 2011b) .
We examine the impact of information regarding other people's choices on individual choice in a public good experiment with two separate treatments. In the implicit treatment, subjects do not see the average contribution of others in their group, but they can calculate it from the information available. In the explicit treatment, subjects see the average contribution of others in their group. If subjects are rational calculating agents as suggested in mainstream economic theory there should be no difference in observed behavior across treatments: agents should use all available information to make decisions.
What we see instead is quite astonishing. First, players change their behavior in response to the change in displayed information (more exactly, one group of players behaves differently in one environment than a different group of similar players in a different environment).
Second, the mix of changes in individual behavior produces identical group outcomes in terms of total payoffs or efficiency. In an everyday context, consider the example of a man who changes his movements with the terrain, to maintain a steady pace. Now consider that the man in our public goods game is actually a women -women's actions change with the information display in our two different treatments, to maintain the same outcome.
How does this happen? The display of the average contribution of others results in behavior consistent with a focal point (Schelling, 1960) , i.e., more subjects behave as reciprocators (conditioning their contributions on the contributions of others), and fewer behave as cooperators or free-riders (unconditionally contributing a lot or a little, respectively).
1 Women are responsible for the change in the mix of types. They behave similarly to men in Explicit, but more women pursue unconditional strategies of free-riding or cooperation in Implicit.
The display of information matters, and it matters because female behavior differs with the information environment.
1 Unfortunately, the experiment does not create a pure focal point (i.e., one equilibrium in many equilibria on which subjects converge with the knowledge that others will also converge) because the display of the average contribution of others facilitates an existing strategy of reciprocation. Nevertheless, we use "focal point" in the loose sense, to describe a feature that subjects converge upon.
The next section describes the experimental treatments. Section 3 presents results, Section 4 has the discussion, and Section 5 concludes. The appendices have game instructions, a discussion of typing methods, and an analysis of subject-pool heterogeneity.
Treatments
In each run of a public goods game (PGG), each player in a group of n splits his endowment (e) between the group's public account and his private account. A subject's total earnings are the sum of his private earnings plus a fraction of the public account. The researcher sets the value of this fraction (the Marginal Contribution Ratio or MCR) somewhere between 1 n and 1.00 -the extremes leaving participants indifferent to, respectively, contribution or non-contribution to the public account.
Given that all players benefit from contributions to the public account, the rational strategy is to free-ride by contributing nothing to the public account and e to the private account -leading to a Nash equilibrium in which all subjects receive e (Ledyard, 1995) . The socialwelfare maximizing strategy is for all subjects to contribute e to the public account and nothing to their private accounts, so that each subject receives M CR(n * e) ≥ e. We define "group efficiency" as average subject earnings (from public and private accounts) divided by maximum possible earnings. A group of free-riders would have an efficiency of e/M CR(n * e) that will range from 100 n percent (when MCR is 1.00 and the public good creates the greatest welfare gains) to 100 percent (when MCR is 1 n and the public good produces no welfare gains).
By observing each player's contributions to the public account, we can also classify him as a "cooperator" (contributing a lot to the public account, independently of what others do), "free-rider" (contributing little or nothing, independently of what others do), or "reciprocator" (contributing more when others do).
2.1. Game Procedure. This PGG is modeled on the sequential-contribution design of Kurzban and Houser (2005) -hereafter KH -where subjects start with an initial, simultaneous contribution and then get one or more chances to update it before the game ends at a random point. In Implicit (as in KH), the average contribution of others is not shown.
In Explicit, the average is shown. Besides this difference [in BOLD below], Implicit and Explicit are identical to each other (but not to KH; see Footnote 11). Appendix A has a copy of the instructions. The games had the following steps:
(1) Subjects were randomly placed in groups of four or five at the beginning of each run.
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(2) In period zero, all subjects had 20 seconds to make a simultaneous, initial contribution to the public account from their 50-token endowments.
3 Participants understood that their remaining tokens were allocated to their private accounts.
Subjects knew they had at least one opportunity to confirm/change their period zero contribution. Provisional contributions were final only when the run ended.
Period zero contributions were non-binding cheap talk, but decisions after period zero were payoff relevant because the run could end at any point.
(3) After period zero, contributions were sequential, i.e., each player had ten seconds to change or confirm his contribution while the rest of the group waited. In Implicit, each subject saw his contribution, the total, and the number of people in his group and "knew" the average contribution of others to be (total-own contribution)/(groupsize-1); see Figure 1 . In Explicit, he sees the average contribution of others; see 2 We used groups of four and five to maximize "yield" among student recruits. There were two Explicit sessions where students were in groups of four or five. If we omit those sessions from the results, the shares of types among the six remaining Explicit sessions are not statistically different from shares in all eight sessions. 3 We use the following terminology: In each session, subjects played five runs of the PGG; each run had 7-32 rounds (individual decisions), grouped into two to eight periods after period zero. After period zero, each period had the same number of rounds as the maximum number of subjects in any group, i.e., a group of four would have four rounds (decisions) in one period. (In mixed groups of four and five, subjects in groups of four waited while the five-player groups finished. Because subjects were already waiting for others in their group, additional waiting for the five-player groups did not affect the flow of the game.) The run endedeven in the middle of a period -when the maximum number of rounds (between 7 and 32) was reached. (5) Updating continued for an unknown, random number of rounds until the run ended, contributions were finalized, and subjects saw their payoffs from public and private contributions. 4 Each subject received one token for each token in his private account and 0.5 token (M CR = 0.5) for each token in the group account.
(6) In each session, there were five runs of the game, each ending after a quasi-random number of rounds. 5 Participants were randomly shuffled into groups and randomly ordered within groups at the beginning of each run and played in the same order for that run. They knew they were in new groups, but they did not know the number of rounds in each run or number of runs in the session.
2.2. Typing Subjects. Each subject played the game for five runs and made one to eight payoff-relevant decisions per run (period zero contributions are ignored) with some players making more decisions than others. 6 Thus, each player in each session has 26-28 "average contribution of others/own contribution" datapoints. 7 Players are typed using these datapoints and the following equation: 5 The first run took 16 rounds, the second was seven rounds, then 23, 32 and 32 rounds. These counts (from KH) were used in all sessions. 6 When the number of rounds divided by the number of players is not an integer the number of observations is not equal; e.g., four subjects playing seven rounds would mean that three subjects played two rounds each and one played a single round. 7 Although it is possible to confound player behavior with behavior of the group, this problem is minimized by reshuffling the players into different groups five times during the session. 8 Since KH's classification method uses point estimates for individuals' parameter values (i.e., ignoring statistical significance; see Appendix B), the error term is ignored. This method therefore ignores both group effects and trend effects. The impact of the former is minimized by shuffling players between groups. Although we ignore trend effects, there is the possibility that learning matters across the five runs. When we retype players using data from runs 2-5 (i.e., controlling for "learning"), 21/296 (seven percent) of players change from one type to another, and aggregate shares of types shift by 0-3 percent. The between-treatment difference of reciprocator shares actually increases. Since this result agrees with (and reinforces) our main result, we also ignore trend.
Cooperator:β ≥ 0 andα ≥ 25, i.e., a cooperator's estimated contribution is nondecreasing in the average contribution of others and always at least 25 (of 50) tokens.
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Free-rider:β ≥ 0 andα +β(50) < 25, i.e., a free-rider's estimated contribution is non-decreasing in the average contribution of others but stays below 25 tokens.
Reciprocator:β ≥ 0,α < 25, andα +β(50) ≥ 25, i.e., a reciprocator's estimated contribution is non-decreasing in the average contribution of others, below 25 tokens when the average contribution of others is zero, and at least 25 tokens when the average contribution of others is 50.
No Type:β i < 0. Players who give less when others give more are classified as "no type" and ignored in further analysis. Figure 3 shows datapoints for subjects who were classified as cooperators and free-riders; Figure 4 shows subjects classified as reciprocators. Each panel shows all data for one player in one session; the fitted line matches regression output, i.e.,x i =α i +β ixi . Note that each dot is a (x igt , x igt ) pair that records the average contributions of others to the public account (independent variable on x-axis) and how much that subject puts in the public account (dependent variable on y-axis).
KH's method of classifying subjects with linear OLS point estimates is fast and easy to use (one can "type" players with a few observations), but some worry that it ignores potentially important factors. First, point estimates ignore the error structure of ϵ igt ; second, type may not fit a linear profile; and third, Tobit is more appropriate for typing censored observations. Appendix B shows that these effects do not have a significant impact on our typing results.
With Occam's Razor in hand, we use KH's method instead of other, more complicated means of classification discussed in, e.g., El-Gamal and Grether ( 
The shares of cooperators in Implicit and Explicit are the same.
The shares of free-riders in Implicit and Explicit are the same. Tables 1 and 2 display results from our treatments with KH's results, but they are not comparable.
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Unclassified students are classified as "no type" and dropped from analysis. The impacts of different shares of males and economists are discussed in Appendix C.
Each session began after subjects signed legal consent/disclosure forms, received their anonymous participant number, and heard directions in Appendix A. Participants played 3. Results Table 2 -adjusted for subject-pool heterogeneity; see Appendix C -shows that Implicit had fewer reciprocators, more cooperators and more free-riders than Explicit. Wilcoxon
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests comparing the shares of types (e.g., shares of reciprocators in eight Implicit sessions to shares in eight Explicit sessions) reject equal shares at the one percent level for all three types, i.e., 12 Such reshuffling means that players in Explicit (which had two sessions with five-player groups) would have been in a mix of four and five-player groups. Given the same 0.5 MCR, the greater incentive to cooperate should have resulted in more cooperators and reciprocators, but the share of cooperators in these two sessions was zero; the shares of reciprocators and free-riders were 88 and 12 percent, respectively compared to 83 and 11 percent in the six Explicit sessions with four-player groups and 84 and 12 percent for all Explicit sessions. (Players in five-player groups who saw larger total contributions -relative to four-player groups -also saw average contributions of others in their group, which would weaken the impression that others were being more generous than they really were.) 13 After Explicit, subjects participated in an auction game; after Implicit, they participated in a different public goods game that tested behavior under varying incentives to cooperate, i.e., tournament, in-group/outgroup, etc. While these games may have had different impacts on questionnaire answers, we cannot isolate these effects.
Discussion
. . . manipulations in the lab experiment can yield drastically different measures of individual propensities. This result does not necessarily imply that preferences are labile. Rather, we view such data as evidence that when critical elements of the situation change, behavior will change in predictable ways.
- Levitt and List (2007, p. 164) Our results offer significant implications for experimental design and policy implementation. Firstly, if subject behavior depends not just on information but on the display of information, then experimenters should be cautious about the design, execution and interpretation of their treatments. Secondly, our evidence suggests that the link between underlying preferences and revealed preferences is not as tight as rational action theory would like it to be. For example, subjects with unconditional preferences as cooperators or free-riders should also behave unconditionally. But framing that leads subjects to behave as reciprocators may lead us to mistakenly assume that we have elicited underlying preferences when we have actually induced behavior (and type) as a response to circumstances (Margolis, 2007, Chapter 9 ). 14 Smith (2003) calls this "ecological rationality," i.e., the notion that we will do the right thing at the right time, and the focal point effect discussed here is consistent with that rationality.
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In the large experimental literature on framing, social interaction and focal points, the following articles touch on the present discussion: Dietrich et al. (2001) show that boundedlyrational players pay attention to displayed information -not what they should know. In Berg et al. (2005) , subjects change from risk averse to risk seeking as framing (the same 14 Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p. s273 ) defines framing as "the language of presentation, on the context of choice and on the nature of the display." 15 Bowles (1998) makes the more radical argument that preferences are endogenous, while McCubbins and Weller (2009) find that player behavior is rational when it's conditioned on their belief about the actions of others.
gamble) changes. Croson (2007) finds that subjects try to match a displayed median contribution more than they try to match the minimum or maximum contribution. 16 Cooper and Rege (2008) find that players' actions tend to polarize around the same choices -a result they attribute to social interaction and peer effects. Czap and Ovchinnikova (2008) arbitrarily make one player a leader in a public goods game and display the leader's contribution; followers' contributions are positively affected by the leader but not vice-versa. In studies that challenge the robustness of effects consistent with a focal point, Crawford et al. (2008) find that a focal point effect deteriorates when payoffs are asymmetric, and Brosig et al. (2008) find that players who behave as unselfish "types" in a dictator game do not do so when the game is repeated weeks later.
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The explicit display of the average contribution of others "causes" more subjects to behave as reciprocators and fewer to behave as cooperators or free-riders. From a policy perspective, this result implies that the display of information on others' actions combined with conformism to social norms can guide agent behavior. Our finding that overall efficiency does not change can be seen either as evidence that such a program of display will not make us worse off, as a group. Alternatively, it may indicate that such a program will not increase social welfare. That latter argument ignores the possibility that a "nudging" policy (that's easy to ignore) may increase overall utility from the process of arriving at a final result. It's not hard to see that participation in a group with a larger share of reciprocators may result in greater procedural utility than participation in a group with free-riders and cooperators (Tyler, 1990; Benz, 2004; Frey, 2005) . Many people dislike free-riders; cooperators attract a combination of disdain and envy (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Rodriguez-Sickert et al., 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008) .
16 She did not include mean contribution, but subject contributions have a similar correlation with observed median and unobserved mean. 17 In the game discussed here, players see the average contribution of others, which reproduces the peerinteraction structure of Croson (2007) and Cooper and Rege (2008) -but not the leader structure of Czap and Ovchinnikova (2008) -and a change in results seen in Dietrich et al. (2001) and Berg et al. (2005) . Because the game uses symmetric payments and repeats only once, it does not test the results of Crawford et al. (2008) or Brosig et al. (2008) , but these treatments are not designed to defend the robustness of focal points or types. Besides this type result, we should see -a là the "match the average finding in Croson (2007) -other evidence that subjects are responding to a focal point, e.g., individual contributions should converge on the average contribution of others in Explicit. Figure 5 shows the absolute value of the difference between the average contribution of subjects typed as reciprocators and the average contribution of others in those subjects' groups. 18 A t-test of the data behind the figure (i.e., comparing average deviations by run.period between Implicit and Explicit) rejects the null hypothesis that differences are equal at the one-percent level.
Individual contributions in explicit are closer to the group average.
For the remainder of this discussion, we will explore the factors driving these resultsstarting with the role of gender (Section 4.1) before trying to understand how the gender effect may result from lazy and/or strategic behavior (Sections 4.2 and 4.3).
18 These data are from 14 sessions with groups of four; two Explicit sessions with groups of five are omitted. results. Since we could not be sure that we were controlling for all relevant differences between KH and Explicit, we ran Implicit six months later. Although we were able to test (and reject) the null hypotheses, our desire to understand why the results differed (and control for subject-pool heterogeneity) led us to run the multinomial logit described in Appendix C. Those results made it clear that gender (female behavior) was driving results.
And now let us proceed. First, let us dismiss the explanation that subjects facing the ten-second clock in Implicit made errors in calculating their contribution -errors that resulted in them being misclassified as free-riders or cooperators when they were "really" reciprocators. Data on individual decisions show that few were made at the last second. Instead, it seems that subjects who wanted to reciprocate had adequate time to make their calculation, and many males (74 percent) did behave as reciprocators. Females, on the other hand, were more likely to pursue the unconditional strategies of cooperation or free-riding.
Gender and Behavior.
Second, we have to consider the so-called "Larry Summers Critique," i.e., the idea that women are not as good at math as men. Although Benjamin et al. (2006) find that men and women calculate equally well, it is possible that women do not bother to make the calculations necessary for reciprocation in Implicit -an explanation that echoes the comparative advantage finding that girls do as well as boys in math and better in reading -leading them to pursue non-mathematical activities (Guiso et al., 2008) . Thus, females may reciprocate less often because they prefer to do otherwise, either because it is easier or because they have other plans. Let us consider these "lazy" and "strategic" explanations. Implicit Avg Explicit Avg Figure 7 . Average absolute value of difference between a male subject's contribution and the average contribution of others in his group Figure 5 results by gender), their behavior patterns differ in each treatment. Table 4 shows that male reciprocators "work harder" to match the average contribution of others in Implicit while women work harder than men (and finish closer to the average contribution of others) in Explicit.
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19 There is little evidence of learning differences between genders. In Explicit, men and women have a similar deviation in period 1 of run 1 (13.75 and 13.58, respectively) and in period 1 of run 5 (11.29 and 11.45, respectively). In Implicit, men (women) start at 15.60 (12.78) and drop to 13.00 (11.45). Implicit Avg Explicit Avg Figure 8 . Average absolute value of difference between a female subject's contribution and the average contribution of others in her group.
These results echo those of Cadsby and Maynes (1998a,b) , who find that groups of females are significantly better at coordinating around a common equilibrium than groups of males, and Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008) , who find that women equal men in competition that involves performance-related feedback, i.e., the case in Explicit.
Because Implicit lacks an equilibrium, women without a focal point may take the easier way out (i.e., adopting an unconditional strategy). Males, on the other hand, may work relatively harder because they are more competitive (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) or want to beat the game (Charness and Levin, 2008) . differently, the behavior of interacting subjects should produce a mix of types (cooperators, free-riders and reciprocators) that results in efficient outcomes appropriate to the treatment.
The data support this idea: Despite a dramatic change in the mix of types, average player efficiencies -at 68.1 percent in Implicit and 67.8 percent in Explicit -are not statistically different (p-value = 0.64). 21 This result -group earnings in each treatment are statistically identical -echoes Smith's "ecological rationality," i.e., that players change their behavior to fit the environment.
The driver of this result appears to be women; they behave differently in different treatments. Such a change has been found elsewhere and attributed to women being more strategic or sensitive to changes in the information environment (Nowell and Tinkler, 1994; Seguino and Lutz, 1996; Benjamin et al., 2007; Leon-Mejia and Miller, 2007; Croson and Gneezy, 2009 ). Since Explicit has a focal point, it is more likely that women will pursue a reciprocation strategy when others are likely to do the same. 
Conclusion
Public goods experiments have failed to find consistent differences in the behavior of men and women -perhaps because of experimental heterogeneity (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009 ). These treatments clarify gender differences by altering a single experimental element (the implicit or explicit display of the average contribution of others)
to show how gender and design interact to produce gender-specific behavior in Implicit but gender-neutral behavior in Explicit. In Explicit, the shares of female and male reciprocators are, respectively, 85 and 83 percent. In Implicit, these shares drop to 49 and 74 percent, respectively (shares of both free-riders and cooperators rise). The difference is significant for females but not for males.
21 Efficiency does not vary by gender either. 22 Do they change "type" in a strategic way to equalize payouts? Although we have no evidence of that (not least because treatments are between-subject), it's possible that these results reflect emergent social coordination.
The best explanation for the difference in results is that women change their behavior when the informational environment changes responding to a visible cue (focal point) that informs them about the social norm. Interestingly, the change in types does not result in different average payouts, indicating that aggregate behavior in each treatment is optimal in the sense of being evolutionarily stable. This suggests that women's behavior balances men's behavior in a way that maintains stability for the whole population. More research is needed to establish whether this result applies to wider pool of subjects, but the policy implications can be quite important in devising incentive systems based on compliance with social norms.
These results also contradict a common (perhaps naive) assumption that preferences reliably map to behavior -underscoring the importance of understanding the impact of design on experimental results.
This is a game of group and individual investment behavior.
• You are in a group of 4 with 3 others, chosen at random. (If you are in a GROUP OF FIVE, you will find out during the game.) • You have an endowment of 50 tokens to invest. Others have the same endowment.
• You invest your tokens in the Individual Exchange and the Group Exchange.
• Your earnings depend on how you and your group invest tokens.
• 50 tokens = $0.75
Every token you invest in the Individual Exchange returns one token in earnings to you only. Every token you invest in the Group Exchange returns 0.5 tokens in earnings to every member of your group, including yourself. It does not matter who invests in the Group Exchange -everyone gets a return from every token invested in the Group Exchange, whether or not they invested.
Your task is to maximize your earnings by choosing how many of your tokens to invest in the Group Exchange. (Remaining tokens go to the Individual Exchange.) Examples: group for an unknown, random number of rounds until the run ends, and all investments are final. You will have at least one opportunity to change/confirm your investment. Although you must wait while the decision passes around your group, try to pay attention so as to not to miss your turn. (4) When each run ends, you will see your investment, the total investment in the Group Exchange, your earnings from the current run, and your cumulative earnings. (5) When the game repeats, players are randomly reshuffled into new groups and the final round changes to a new, random number.
Appendix B. Typing Subjects Table 5 compares shares of types resulting from KH's OLS method (described in Section 2.2) and other OLS methods (discussed below). To reduce confusion and maintain focus on typing methods (as opposed to outcomes), shares of each type under each method are shown for the Explicit treatment only. Bias is introduced when insignificant estimates are set to zero because zero values ofβ are associated with free-riders. Put differently, assigning individuals with coefficients that are not significantly different from zero to the free-rider group would overstate the importance of freeriders. We can see this effect in Table 5 , where the share of free-riders rises from 12 percent with point estimated coefficients to 27 percent with significant coefficients only.
B.2. Quadratic Form. KH's typing method forces each player's actions to fit a linear form, and it is not hard to imagine that some players may play a different strategy, e.g., increasing contributions up to a certain point and then decreasing them. Fischbacher et al. (2001) find that 14 percent of subjects have such a "hump-shaped" contribution profile.
Allowing for quadratic variation in Equation (1) gives us:
wherex i is the average contribution of others for all rounds and γ i is an additional parameter to be estimated.x i is used in (x igt −x i ) 2 to increase variation in the quadratic relationship and reduce problems with collinearity.
When typing with Equation 2, six subjects are excluded as "no type" (meaningful negative β and γ coefficients). Of the 138 remaining subjects, 14 percent (as in Fischbacher et al. (2001) ) are humped types (positive β and negative γ coefficients); 4 percent are cooperators; 10 percent are free-riders; and 72 percent are reciprocators.
How do we interpret these results? The main shift (compared to the linear-only method) is from reciprocators to hump-shaped. In Table 5 , we see that the share of reciprocators in OLS falls from 84 percent to 72 percent in OLS-quadratic, which has 14 percent hump-shaped types. This result implies that some subjects typed as reciprocators with a linear approximation are really contributing fewer tokens when the average contribution to the public account is above 28-30 tokens.
We do not use quadratic estimates because classification of types is more arbitrary (without statistical significance as a filter, most subjects have some value for γ, which introduces confusion as to who is a free-rider, reciprocator, etc.), and the only difference appears to be a transfer from reciprocators to hump-shaped types. (It would be more troubling if free-riders and cooperators also moved to hump-shaped types.) B.3. Tobit Model. Finally, there is the much larger issue of contributions that are censored at upper and lower boundaries in the estimation model (46 percent of contribution decisions -x igt values -are 0 or 50). Since an OLS estimate of the relationship between censored values of x igt andx igt will produce inconsistent estimates, a Tobit model would probably be more accurate. We do not use Tobit because we would need to create a typing scheme around different estimates, which is not the point of this paper.
Appendix C. Controlling for Subject Pools
It is possible that subject-pool heterogeneity affected the mix of types -recall the differing shares of males and economists in Table 1 . A multinomial logit model is used to test the effect of gender, field of study, etc. on type. Note that type depends on coefficients from individual OLS regressions of own contribution on average contribution of others. MLOGIT estimations use type as the dependent variable and previously-unused subject characteristics as independent variables. Table 6 has regression output, and Table 7 shows the estimated marginal effects of independent variables on the probability of being classified as a given type.
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Note that the Trust Index (TI) RHS variable is calculated from the answer to four yes/no questions: "People generally do the right thing," "I find it better to accept others for what they say and appear to be," "I am doubtful of others until we know they can be trusted," and "I almost always believe what people tell me."
24 Yes answers are added (+1,+1,-1,+1) to get individual TI values between −1 and 3. Although the correlation between answers to these questions and types in a PGG is not perfect (e.g., someone who trusts others may be greedy, i.e., a free-rider), there is good reason to believe that stated preferences should match revealed preferences. Put differently, TI values should be higher for cooperators, lower for free-riders and somewhere in-between for reciprocators; see, e.g., Tabellini (2008) .
The estimated marginal effects indicate that a participant in Explicit is 6 percent (insignificant) less likely to be a cooperator, 25 percent less likely to be a free-rider, and 30 percent more likely to be a reciprocator. Field of study (economics, quantitative or non-quantitative) is not statisticallycorrelated with behavior or types. Males in Implicit are 3 percent (insignificant) less likely than females to be cooperators, 17 percent less likely to be free-riders, and 20 percent more likely to be reciprocators.
25 These results reflect the importance of gender and treatment on behavior, types and outcomes.
An adjustment to Implicit results that reflects different shares of males in subject pools (42 percent in Implicit and 57 percent in Explicit) would shift about 3 percent of all subjects (males are 20 percent more likely to reciprocate, but they were 15 percent fewer) from free riders (29.5 falls to 26.5%) to reciprocators (59.7 rises to 62.7%). Table 8 shows results before adjustment; Table 9 shows these adjusted shares, which we consider to be a more accurate reflection of the mix of types in our subject pool.
Importantly, it appears that males are not affected by the difference in treatments. When we rerun the MLOGIT with a dummy to compare male and female behavior between treatments (i.e., replace dummies for Explicit, Male x Explicit & Male x Implicit with dummies for Male, Female x Explicit & Male x Explicit), coefficients on Male are significant for free-riders and reciprocators and significant for all types for Female x Explicit but not significant for Male x Explicit. Thus it appears that treatment effects manifest entirely through females.
23 A multinomial probit has a similar fit with slightly-higher statistical significance. The addition of a noninteracted male dummy does not change results. 24 Pre-testing included 20 "Machiavellian" questions (see Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) ), and the four with the lowest collinearity were retained. 25 We use Male x Implicit and Male x Explicit instead of the more conventional Male and Male x Explicit to get clean estimates of between-treatment gender differences. Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels 
